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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Phillip Andrew Turney appeals from the judgment and sentence entered 
upon the jury's verdict finding him guilty of two counts of aggravated driving 
under the influence and a persistent violator enhancement. Turney contends that 
the district court twice placed him in jeopardy for the same crime when he was 
charged with two separate counts of aggravated DUI, where there was only one 
act of driving, and that the district court abused its discretion in sentencing him. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedinas 
In 2004, Turney contracted as a cab driver with "U.S. Taxi" in Boise. (Trial 
Tr., p.435, Ls.18-22; p.436, Ls.13-21.) On the evening of December 23, 2004, 
Turney and Tom Sage ("Tom"), a driver for "Ace" cab company, decided to 
"break off about 11:OO o'clock ... to go out to one of the bars." (Trial Tr., p.434, 
Ls.8-10; p.437, Ls.14-21; p.439, Ls.3-13.) As planned, Turney picked up Tom 
and drove them in his taxi to T h e  Fireside" bar. (Trial Tr., p.439, L.17 - p.440, 
L.9; p.754, L.15 - p.755, L.6.) After they had "a couple of shots" at "The 
Fireside" (Trial Tr., p.441, Ls.4-9), Tom drove Turney's taxi to another local bar - 
"The Navajo [Room]" - where Tom and Turney continued drinking (Trial Tr., 
p.441, Ls.10-13; p.443, Ls.17-18; p.444, L.2 - p.445, L.l). They left "The 
Navajo" around 1:30 a.m. on December ~ 4 ' ~  and Tom drove them to his 
apartment. (Trial Tr., p.445, Ls.13-17; p.446, Ls.4-16.) According to Tom, when 
they arrived at his apartment about fifteen minutes later he got out (Trial Tr., 
p.447, Ls.11-22; p.448, Ls.8-12) and Turney "got in the driver's seat [of his 
taxi]. . .insisted that he would be fine . . . and drove off' (Trial Tr., p.448, Ls.8-24). 
Shortly after 3 a.m. that morning, 9-1-1 dispatch reported a "possible 
intoxicated [female] driver ... in the area of Nez Perce and Vista at the Jackson 
station ... in a blue Nissan Pathfinder, license plate 1A L6538." (Trial Tr., p.22, 
Ls.3-15; p.39, Ls.15-17; p.42, Ls.17-19; p.59, Ls.13-19.) Within minutes of 
receiving this bulletin, Boise City Police Officer White stopped a blue Nissan 
Pathfinder near the intersection of Vista and Palouse. (Trial Tr., p.59, L.22 - 
p.60, L.16.) Upon observing the driver of the Pathfinder, Travis Anderson, 
Officer White suspected he was operating the vehicle under the influence of 
alcohol. (Trial Tr., p.61, Ls.22-25.) When Sergeant Hagler arrived to provide 
back-up (Trial Tr., p.61, Ls.10-16; p.62, Ls.1-3), Officer White conducted field 
sobriety tests of Mr. Anderson and ultimately arrested him for DUI (Trial Tr., p.62, 
Ls.3-22). After Mr. Anderson was handcuffed and seated in the back of Officer 
White's patrol vehicle (Trial Tr., p.62, Ls.8-12), Sergeant Hagler moved the 
Pathfinder off the street (Trial Tr., p.63, L.25 - p.64, L.2). He then returned to his 
patrol car parked directly behind Officer White's vehicle and waited for Officer 
White to complete the investigation. (Trial Tr., p.64, L.25 - p.65, p.7.) 
As Officer White started to enter the Pathfinder's license plate into the 
mobile data terminal located in his patrol car, he heard a loud crash and went 
"flying forward hitting ... [the] steering wheel." (Trial Tr., p.66, Ls.1-8; p.70, Ls.1- 
5; State's Exhibit IA.) Officer White immediately went to check on Sergeant 
Hagler and observed that Sergeant Hagler's patrol car was "smashed ... and 
extensively damaged" to the extent "the whole back end of his car was gone." 
(Trial Tr., p.66, Ls.8-14; p.67, Ls.10-11; State's Exhibits 10-23.) Officer White 
found Sergeant Hagler in the driver's seat leaning to the right with his mouth 
open, his eyes rolled back, and completely disoriented; Sergeant Hagler could 
talk but was not coherent. (Trial Tr., p.66, Ls.21-25; p.67, Ls.13-24; p.88, Ls.17- 
24; State's Exhibit 17.) Officer White immediately called dispatch to report that 
he and Sergeant Hagler had been involved in a crash. (Trial Tr., p.67, Ls.5-7; 
p.75, Ls.8-25; p.331, Ls.1-3; State's Exhibit 1.) Concerned for Mr. Anderson, 
Officer White pulled him from the back of his patrol car and sat him on the 
ground. (Trial Tr., p.68, Ls.2-8.) In the course of stabilizing the scene (Trial Tr., 
p.68, Ls.18-19), Officer White saw Turney open up the driver's side door of the 
taxicab that smashed into the parked patrol cars and roll out on the ground (Trial 
Tr., p.66, Ls.15-20; p.85, L.4 - p.86, L.1; p.86, L.21 - p.87, L.19). As other 
officers arrived they took control over the accident investigation. (Trial Tr., p.68, 
Ls.20-21.) Firemen at the scene extricated Sergeant Hagler from his patrol car. 
(Trial Tr., p.80, Ls.7-24; State's Exhibits I 1  -12.) 
Both Officer White and Sergeant Hagier sustained serious injuries and 
were transported by ambulance to the hospital. (Trial Tr., p.94, L.lO; p.96, Ls.1- 
6.) Although Officer White was cleared to return to work three weeks later, he 
continued to be treated for injuries to his back and neck. (Trial Tr., p.99, L.3 - 
p.102, L.16.) At the time of trial, nearly fourteen months later, Officer White was 
still undergoing treatment; he had received a "five percent impairment rating on 
his neck and was scheduled to undergo extensive shoulder surgery. (Trial Tr., 
p.102, L.20 - p.103, L.7.) Sergeant Hagler sustained several injuries including a 
brain injury, memory loss, a broken nose, numbness in his hands, a neck injury 
and a low back injury causing him to struggle with decreased work performance. 
(Trial Tr., p.695, L.19 - p.699, L.22.) 
The state charged Turney with two counts of aggravated driving under the 
influence, in violation of I.C. 9 18-8006, for the injuries inflicted on Boise City 
Police Officers Hagler and White as a result of Turney's taxicab smashing into 
their parked patrol cars. (R., pp.25-26; 101-02.) The state also charged Turney 
with being a persistent violator. (R., pp. 36-38.) At trial, Turney admitted he blew 
. I 6  shortly after the crash (Trial Tr., p.759, Ls.20-23; p.764, Ls.15-24; p.776, 
Ls.11-13; p.797, Ls.8-13) but denied he was driving the taxi (Trial Tr., p.775, 
Ls.17-18; p.776, Ls.10-14). Turney contended he had fallen asleep in the 
backseat and that Tom was actually driving the taxi at the time of the crash. 
(Trial Tr., p.766, L.20 - p.768, L.2; p.769, Ls.2-4; p.774, Ls.5-9; Trial Tr., p.775, 
Ls.17-18; p.803, Ls.23-24.) At trial Tom admitted to driving Turney's cab earlier 
in the evening, but testified that he was not in the taxi or driving it at the time of 
the accident. (Trial Tr., p.441, L.18 - p.444, L.13; p.448, L.8 - p.449, L.13.) 
After a five day trial, the jury found Turney guilty of both counts of aggravated 
DUI and of being a persistent violator. (R., pp.139-41.) The district court 
sentenced Turney to concurrent unified life sentences, with a minimum period of 
confinement of fifteen years. (Sent. Tr., p.1050, L.2 - p.1051, L.4; R., pp.158- 
60.) The district court denied Turney's Rule 35 Motion. (R., pp.187-90.) Turney 
timely appealed. (R., pp.162-64; 192-95.) 
ISSUES 
Turney states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Was Mr. Turney twice put in jeopardy for the same offense 
when he was charged and convicted of two counts of 
aggravated DUI when there was only one act of driving? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed 
concurrent sentences of life, with fifteen years fixed? 
(Appellant's brief, p.5.) 
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as: 
1. Has Turney's failure to file a I.C.R. 12(b)(2) motion challenging the 
information prior to trial preclude him from challenging the information now for the 
first time on appeal? 
2. If Turney's claim is reviewable, has Turney failed to establish that he 
was punished twice for the same offense? 
3. Has Turney failed to carry his burden of establishing that the district 
court abused its discretion when it imposed concurrent unified life sentences with 




Turnev's Failure To Challenge Defects In The lnformation Prior To Trial 
Precludes Turnev From Raising This lssue For The First Time On Appeal 
A. Introduction 
For the first time on appeal, Turney argues that his right to be free from 
double jeopardy was violated because, he claims, "he was charged with two 
separate counts of aggravated DUI ... [when] there was clearly only one act of 
driving." (Appellant's brief, p.6 (emphasis added).) Turney's claim fails. An 
objection or claim based upon defects in the information can be waived. 
Because Turney failed to object to the charges in the information prior to trial, he 
is barred from raising the issue on appeal. As such, Turney's claim was not 
preserved for appeal and should be dismissed. 
B. Standard of Review 
Interpretation of court rules is a question of law reviewed de novo. 
State v. Moore, 131 ldaho 814, 821, 965 P.2d 174, 181 (1998). 
C. Turnev's Double Jeopardy Claim Based Upon His Objection To The 
lnformation is Barred Bv His Failure To Raise The lssue Prior To Trial As 
Required By I.C.R. 12(b)(2) 
"It is a fundamental tenet of appellate law that a proper and timely 
objection must be made in the trial court before an issue is preserved for appeal." 
State v. Carlson, 134 ldaho 389, 398, 3 P.3d 67, 76 (Ct. App. 2000). This same 
principle is embodied in I.C.R. 12, which reads, in relevant part: 
(b) Pretrial motions. Any defense objection or request which is 
capable of determination without trial of the general issue may be 
raised before trial by motion. The following must be raised prior o 
trial: 
.... 
(2) Defenses and objections based upon defects in the 
complaint, indictment or information (other than it fails to show 
jurisdiction of the court or to charge any offense which objection 
shall be noticed by the court at any time during the pendency of the 
proceedings); 
.... 
(9 Effect of Failure to Raise Defenses or Objections. Failure by 
the defendant to raise defenses or objections or to make requests 
which must be made prior to trial ... shall constitute waiver thereof, 
but the court for cause shown may grant relief from the waiver. 
I.C.R. 12 (emphasis in original). 
The ldaho Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed this rule: 
The are a host of due process requirements that must be 
met by a charging document, such as factual specificity adequate 
to "enable a person of common understanding to know what is 
intended" and to shield against double jeopardy. State v. Grady, 89 
ldaho 204, 208-09, 404 P.2d 347, 349-50 (1965); see I.C. § 19- 
1418. Although such due process concerns may be valid, they are 
waived unless raised before trial. I.C.R. 12(b)(2); State v. 
Halbesleben, 139 ldaho 165, 168, 75 P.3d 219, 222 (Ct. App. 
2003); State v. Robran, 119 ldaho at 287, 805 P.2d at 493. 
State v. Jones, 140 ldaho 755, 758, 101 P.3d 699, 702 (2004) (where the 
defendant moved to dismiss the charges prior to trial alleging that the information 
failed to allege sufficient facts to provide notice and protect against double 
jeopardy). 
Although Turney "acknowledges that no objection was made in the district 
court to [the state] bringing two charges of aggravated DUI," a review of his claim 
shows Turney is attempting to now belatedly raise a claim there are defects in 
the information for the first time on appeal. Such challenges to the charging 
document, however, must be made prior to trial. I.C.R. 12(b)(2). Turney's 
appellate claim that the state was precluded from charging two counts of 
aggravated DUI is, therefore, not preserved and may not be considered for the 
first time on appeal absent a showing of fundamental error. See State v. 
Anderson, 144 ldaho 743,748, 170 P.3d 886,891 (2007). 
"Before reaching the issue of whether fundamental error is reviewable, or 
whether fundamental error occurred at all, it first must be determined whether the 
district court even committed an error." Anderson, 144 ldaho at 748, 170 P.3d at 
891. In this case, Turney's mere implication of a double jeopardy claim based 
upon the information charging two counts of aggravated DUI does not constitute 
error, much less fundamental error. Under I.C.R. 12(b)(2), a motion to dismiss 
based upon objections to the information which are not jurisdictional or based 
upon a failure to charge must be raised prior to trial, and the failure to timely raise 
such objections results in a waiver of that claim on appeal. I.C.R. 12(b)(2) and 
I.C.R. IZ(f). Jones, 140 ldaho 755, 758, 101 P.3d 699, 702. (citing State v. Luke, 
134 ldaho 294, 300, 1 P.3d 795, 801 (2000)); see State v. Quintero, 141 ldaho 
619, 115 P.3d 710 (2005) (holding that any due process challenges to the 
information were waived because they were not raised before commencement of 
trial, but Quintero could raise a jurisdictional challenge to information); State v. 
Cahoon, 116 ldaho 399, 400, 775 P.2d 1241, 1242 (1989) (concluding that the 
defendant could challenge the sufficiency of a citation, but that the citation 
charged the offense for which the defendant was convicted). Turney's right to 
challenge any defects in the information was waived when he failed to raise this 
issue prior to trial. I.C.R. 12(b). As such, Turney has failed to show error, much 
less fundamental error. 
In addition. this Court should not be inclined to conclude an error is 
fundamental in cases where the failure to challenge the information "may be 
done for legitimate strategic or tactical purposes." Mintun v. State, 144 ldaho 
656, 662, 168 P.3d 40, 46 (Ct. App. 2007) (citations omitted) (noting that "a trial 
attorney's failure to object to inadmissible evidence or other potential errors may 
be done for legitimate strategic or tactical purposes.") It is quite possible in this 
case that counsel for Turney did not object to the information charging him with 
committing two counts of aggravated DUI because it would serve no purpose (as 
discussed in more detail in Section 11, below) other than to highlight that two 
Boise City police officers were seriously injured by Turney's drunk driving. The 
victims in this case should not be subject to another trial because counsel failed 
to object to the information and may have done so solely for tactical reasons 
II. 
Even If Turnev's Challeqe To The Complaint Was Not Waived, Turnev Has 
Failed To Establish A Double Jeopardv Violation 
A. Introduction 
Even if this Court determines Turney's claim challenging the information is 
reviewable, his claim that the state violated his right to be free from double 
jeopardy is not supported in law. In arguing the state twice placed him in 
jeopardy when he was convicted of two counts of aggravated DUI which arose 
out of one act of driving (Appellant's brief, pp.7-12), Turney ignores contrary 
ldaho Supreme Court case law which holds otherwise, 
B. Standard of Review 
Whether a prosecution complies with the constitutional protection against 
being placed twice in jeopardy is a question of law subject to free review. State 
v. Hussain, 143 ldaho 175, 176, 139 P.3d 777,778 (Ct. App. 2006). 
C. Turney Has Failed To Establish That The State Violated Turney's Double 
Jeopardy Riqhts By Pursuing Two Counts Of Agqravated DUI 
Turney has failed to establish that he was punished twice for the same 
offense in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The 
Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution provides that no 
person shall "be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or 
limb." This Clause affords a defendant three basic protections. It protects 
against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, a second 
prosecution for the same offense after conviction, and multiple criminal 
punishments for the same offense. Schiro v. Farley, 510 U.S. 222, 229 (1994); 
State v. McKeeth, 136 ldaho 619, 622, 38 P.3d 1275, 1278 (Ct. App. 2001). 
However, "offenses committed against multiple victims are not the same offense, 
for double jeopardy purposes, even though they may arise from the same 
criminal episode." State v. Alsanea, 138 ldaho 733, 744, 69 P.3d 153,164 (Ct. 
App. 2003); see also State v. Maior, 11 1 ldaho 41 0, 41 5 n. I ,  725 P.2d 11 5, 120 
n.1 (1986) (m Wilkoff v. Superior Court, 696 P.2d 134, 138 (Cal. 1985)). 
In this case, Turney was convicted of two counts of aggravated DUI, I.C. 3 
18-8006, for causing debilitating injuries to two victims - Sergeant Hagler and 
Officer White - when he crashed his taxi while driving with a . I 6  blood alcohol 
level. Although Turney's single act of driving while intoxicated injured multiple 
victims for which he was subjected to multiple punishments, Turney nevertheless 
attempts to raise a "double jeopardy" claim, relying specifically on the ldaho 
Court of Appeals' decision in State v. Lowe, 120 ldaho 391, 816 P.2d 347 (1990). 
Although no double jeopardy claim was raised in &, Turney cites & 
(hereinafter "Lowe I") for the proposition that multiple punishments are 
permissible "when multiple injuries result from a single act of violence." Lowe I, 
120 ldaho at 393, 816 P.2d at 349 (emphasis added). (Appellant's brief, pp.9- 
12.) He further relies on Judge Swanstrom's specially concurring opinion in 
Lowe I, to suggest "a different rule should apply to crimes of aggravated DUf 
under 5 18-8006." 
Turney's reliance on Lowe I, however, is misplaced, especially given the 
ldaho Supreme Court's subsequent review of that decision. In granting review of 
Lowe I, the ldaho Supreme Court did not adopt such a rule. State v. Lowe, 120 -
ldaho 252, 255, 815 P.2d 450, 453 (1991) (hereinafter "Lowe 11"). Rather, the 
ldaho Supreme Court determined multiple punishments are permissible where a 
defendant's single act of driving under the influence results in serious injuries to 
more than one victim. Id. In adopting a "multiple victims" test, the ldaho 
Supreme Court explained: 
In this case, there were two victims. The fact that Lowe's vehicle 
collided with the Smith vehicle only once, does not mean Lowe was 
guilty of only one act or omission. Lowe's conduct constituted a 
separate act or omission with regard to each victim. 
.... 
In this case, the fact that the person who suffered great bodily harm 
in the aggravated DUI (Blake) is different than the person who was 
killed in the vehicular manslaughter (Mary) is significant. Lowe's 
injury of Blake was one act or omission; Lowe's killing of Mary was 
another act or omission. I.C. Ij 18-301 was not intended to prevent 
multiple prosecutions or punishments in cases where more than 
one victim is involved. 
m, 120 ldaho at 255, 815 P.2d at 453 (1991). Directly contrary to Turney's 
contention, the ldaho Supreme Court has determined, specifically relying upon its 
analysis in Lowe II, that the state is authorized to prosecute and punish an 
individual for multiple counts of aggravated DUI that arise from one incident. 
State v. Garner, 121 ldaho 196, 824 P.2d 127 (1992) (affirming convictions and 
sentences for three counts of aggravated DUI where three victims were injured in 
a collision caused by the defendant's act of driving while intoxicated). 
Although neither Lowe II or Garner involved claims of constitutional double 
jeopardy, both cases involved claims brought under I.C. Ij 18-301 (repealed 
1995) which provided a greater scope of protection than that found in the ldaho 
and United States Constitutions. See State v. Seamons, 126 ldaho 809, 811, 
892 P.2d 484, 486 (Ct. App. 1995) ("I.C. Ij 18-301 provides a greater scope of 
protection than the constraints of double jeopardy found in the ldaho and United 
States Constitutions"); State v. Horn, 101 ldaho 192, 197, 610 P.2d 551, 556 
(1980) ("I.C. Ij 18-301 exceeds the scope of the constitutional constraints on 
double jeopardy"). That the ldaho Supreme Court found no double jeopardy 
violation under the broader provisions of I.C. 3 18-301 (repealed 1995) shows 
that the legislature did not intend for defendants who injure multiple victims to be 
punished only once. 
The question under the Double Jeopardy Clause whether punishments 
are "multiple" is essentially one of legislative intent. State v. Osweiler, 140 ldaho 
824, 826, 103 P.3d 437,439 (2004) ( a  Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493,499 
(1984). Even if the crimes are the same, if it is evident that a state legislature 
intended to authorize cumulative punishments, a court's inquiry ends. Osweiler, 
140 ldaho at 827, 103 P.3d 440 (m Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 500 n.8). 
"Where the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, legislative history 
and other extrinsic evidence should not be consulted for the purpose of altering 
the clearly expressed intent of the legislature." State v. Mercer, 143 ldaho 108, 
109, 138 P.3d 308, 309 (2006) (quoting State v. Hart, 135 ldaho 827, 829, 25 
P.3d 850, 852 (2001)). "In construing statutes, the plain, obvious and rational 
meaning is always to be preferred to any curious, narrow hidden sense." Mercer, 
143 ldaho at 109, 138 P.3d at 309 (quoting Hiaainson v. Westeraard, 100 ldaho 
687, 691, 604 P.2d 51, 55 (1979). "In determining the ordinary meaning of a 
statute 'effect must be given to all the words of the statute if possible, so that 
none will be void, superfluous, or redundant."' Mercer, 143 ldaho at 109, 138 
P.3d at 309 ( a  In re Winton Lumber Company, 57 Idaho 131, 136, 63 P.2d 
664, 666 (1 936)) 
Here, Turney was charged, convicted and ultimately sentenced for two 
violations of the aggravated DUI statute which provides, in pertinent part, that the 
defendant shall be guilty of a felony for "causing great bodily harm, permanent 
disability or permanent disfigurement to any person other than himself' while 
driving under the influence. I.C. § 18-8006(1). Based upon this plain language, 
the legislature has criminalized the act of causing harm not merely increased the 
punishment for DUI. Turney's argument that the crime of aggravated DUI in 
violation of I.C. 18-8006(1) is an enhancement statute which "simply raise[s] the 
punishment for DUI to a felony when great bodily injury occurs" (Appellant's brief, 
p . l l ) ,  is directly contrary to the legislative intent. The legislature specifically 
intended that a defendant, such as Turney, may be punished for violation of I.C. 
§ 18-8006 whenever "any" victim is injured by his act of driving under the 
influence. Turney's argument is contrary to the plain language of I.C. § 18-8006, 
and as such, his double jeopardy claim fails. 
Turney's contention that he is being twice punished for one act of drunk 
driving is without merit. Turney is being punished for two acts of injuring two 
other human beings. Because the two aggravated DUI convictions in this case 
did not result in Turney being twice placed in jeopardy for the same offense, he is 
not entitled to relief 
111. 
Turnev Has Failed To Establish An Abuse Of The Sentencing Court's Discretion 
A. Introduction 
The district court imposed concurrent terms of life imprisonment with 
fifteen years fixed upon a jury finding Turney guilty of two counts of aggravated 
DUI and being a persistent violator. (R., pp. 158-60.) Although Turney contends 
on appeal that his sentences are excessive (Appellant's brief, pp.12-14), he has 
failed to show from the record that the district court abused its discretion 
B. Standard of Review 
When a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellate court will review it 
only for an abuse of discretion. State v. Farwell, 144 ldaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d 
397, 401 (2007). The appellant has the burden of demonstrating that the 
sentencing court abused its discretion. Id. 
C. Turnev Has Failed To Establish The Sentences Imposed Are Excessive 
Under Anv Reasonable View of the Facts 
To bear the burden of demonstrating an abuse of discretion, the appellant 
must establish that, under any reasonable view of the facts, the sentence was 
excessive. Farwell, 144 ldaho at 736, 170 P.3d at 401 (2007). To establish that 
the sentence was excessive, he must demonstrate that reasonable minds could 
not conclude the sentence was appropriate to accomplish the sentencing goals 
of protecting society, deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution. Id. Where 
reasonable minds might differ, the sentences imposed by the district court must 
stand. State v. Toohill, 103 ldaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982). 
Aggravated DUI is a felony punishable by a maximum ten year period of 
incarceration. I.C. 3 18-8006(1)(a).' However, when a defendant, like Turney, is 
convicted of aggravated DUI and is also found to be a persistent violator, his 
underlying sentences may be enhanced up to life imprisonment. I.C. 3 19-2514. 
Turney does not contend his sentences fall outside of the statutory limits. 
(Appellant's brief, p.12.) Instead, he asserts the trial court abused its sentencing 
1 When Turney was sentenced on May 3, 2006, I.C. § 18-8006(1)(a) provided for 
a maximum ten year period of incarceration. I.C. § 18-8006(1)(a), however, was 
subsequently amended and the maximum period of incarceration was increased 
from ten to fifteen years. See 2006 ldaho Session Laws, ch. 261. 
discretion given he was "truthful in the past" and has "potential for the future." 
(Appellant's brief, p.14.) 
Contrary to Turney's assertions on appeal, the facts of this case clearly 
support the sentences imposed. In sentencing Turney the district court 
examined the the relevant legal criteria. (Sent. Tr., p. 1038, L. l  - p. 1049, L.1.) 
The court considered protection of society as its foremost obligation, recognizing 
that "[alggravated DUls are particularly heinous .... [as] these kinds of activities 
kill and maim innocent people." (Sent. Tr., p.1038, L.6 - p.1039, L.3.) In this 
case, Turney put other peoples' lives in danger when he decided to drink and 
drive and in fact seriously injured two veteran Boise police officers when he 
smashed his taxicab into their patrol cars. 
The sentencing court examined Turney's twenty-year criminal history, 
which included seven prior felony convictions (larceny, grand theft by 
possession, theft by receiving stolen property, grand theft, using a telephone to 
harass, forgery (2 times)) and his failed attempts at probation. (Sent. Tr., p.1046, 
L.17 - p.1049, L.1; PSI, pp.3-7.) In reviewing the PSI, the court also noted 
Turney's behavior had not changed while he was incarcerated: 
While in prison you racked up a number of disciplinary reports 
which includes substance abuse at prison and your continued use 
and your continued misbehavior includes, I will note, lying to staff. I 
bring that up because both you and your counsel have maintained 
that you are not untruthful. 
(Sent. Tr., p.1043, Ls.17-21.) Given his criminal history, the district court 
specifically discounted Turney's claim of being truthful, reasoning: 
[Tlhe forgeries are crimes that suggest you are untruthful. 
But more importantly, I agree with Miss Longhurst [the prosecutor], 
you told a version which was sympathetic to the jury, I think 
calculated, to suggest that you were somehow the victim ... in 
these forgeries, that you did not know signing someone else's 
name was somehow a violation of law.. . . 
So for all of your counsel's representations and yours that 
you are truthful, clearly you are not truthful because you lied to the 
jury in an effort to make them feel sorry for you and in an effort to 
mitigate the effect of them learning that you were a felon. So you 
somewhat cleverly decided to bring it out in your direct examination 
so that you could present your side to the jury. But you and I know 
that what you told the jury was not true. So all of this business 
today of you're not a liar, you've always taken responsibility for 
what it is that you have done, that you are truthful is not true. 
. . . . 
It's important because you are now standing before the 
Court proclaiming that you continue to be innocent and you and 
your attorney are suggesting that somehow this should mitigate the 
punishment and that I should believe it because you are truthful 
when the record clearly establishes that you are not truthful. 
(Sent. Tr., p.1044, L.10 - p.1046, L.11.) The court was also not impressed with 
Turney's claimed desire to submit to a polygraph test noting that "nothing 
prevented you [Turney] from going out and doing your own polygraph if that is 
what you really wanted to do." (Sent. Tr., p.1033, Ls.5-13; p.1037, Ls.12-25.) 
Despite Turney's contention, the court did take into account his "potential 
for the future," however, the court was troubled that, despite having "a lot of 
programming," Turney's prior attempts at rehabilitation failed: 
The other thing that I [the court] noticed is that you've had a lot of 
programming. You've had cognitive self-change, you've had whole 
vision, you've had thinking errors, breaking barriers, anger 
management, rationale recovery. You have been to Port of Hope. 
You have had a lot of programming, none of it has worked. 
(Sent. Tr., p.1043, Ls.11-16.) 
Turney's sentences are not excessive given the nature of his offenses, his 
character and his unwillingness to accept responsibility for his actions. The 
district court noted Turney's failure to accept responsibility, emphasized the 
seriousness of the offense and Turney's history, and considered all other 
information before it, including Turney's "truthfulness" and "potential for the 
future" and determined "imprisonment is appropriate punishment." (Sent. Tr., 
p.1039, Ls.6-7.) Under any reasonable view of the facts in this case, the district 
court acted well within its discretion when it imposed concurrent unified life 
sentences with fifteen years fixed upon a jury convicting Turney for two counts of 
aggravated DUE and being a persistent violator. The record shows the sentences 
imposed were not only warranted, but also necessary to achieve the primary 
sentencing objective of protecting society. Turney has failed to carry his burden 
of establishing that the sentencing court abused its discretion 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests dismissal of Turney's appeal on the 
grounds that he failed to challenge the information in a timely I.C.R. 12(b)(2) 
motion prior to trial. In the alternative, the state requests this Court affirm both of 
Turney's convictions and concurrent sentences for aggravated DUI and being a 
persistent violator. 
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